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I. INTRODUCTION
Religion is a fundamental aspect of the lives of billions of people across
the world.1 Its enormous reach extends to numerous areas of modern
society including the political realm,2 legal realm,3 and popular culture.4
Notwithstanding this broad influence, religion is a polarizing topic seldom

1. According to a study conducted by the Pew Research Center, more than eight
out of ten people worldwide identify with a religious group. The Global Religious
Landscape, P EW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 18, 2012), https://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/
global-religious-landscape-exec/ [https://perma.cc/SF8R-HXC7]. “There are roughly 5.8
billion religiously affiliated adults and children around the globe, representing 85% of the
world population of 2010.” Id.
2. See Religion & Politics, P EW R SCH. C TR ., https://www.pewresearch.org/
topics/religion-and-politics/ [https://perma.cc/656E-GKEQ] (providing numerous articles
about the interplay between religion and politics). However, many Americans believe that
religion should stay out of politics. Americans Have Positive Views About Religion’s Role
in Society, But Want it Out of Politics, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.pew
forum.org/2019/11/15/americans-have-positive-views-about-religions-role-in-society-butwant-it-out-of-politics/ [https://perma.cc/P9CZ-LGMY] (finding that nearly two thirds of
Americans believe that churches and houses of worship should keep out of political
matters).
3. See Camille Veselka, A Detrimental Influence: The Effect Religion Has on
Laws, HUFFPOST (Feb. 4, 2012), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/a-detrimental-influencet_b_1106045 [https://perma.cc/LHH5-9HLH] (highlighting how religion affects laws and
arguing that religion should be kept separate from laws). Currently, forty-five states and
the District of Columbia have religious exception laws, and fifteen states allow moral or
philosophical exemptions, illustrating the vast effect that religion has on the American
legal field. Kate Cohen, What’s So Special About ‘Religious Belief’?, WASH. POST (Oct.
6, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/10/06/whats-so-special-aboutreligious-belief/ [https://perma.cc/2SM7-AT69]. Some advocate for the addition of religious
values into the judicial decision-making process. See Scott C. Idleman, Note, The Role of
Religious Values in Judicial Decision Making, 68 IND. L.J. 433 (1993). The author believes
that judges should look to religion because of the historical significance of religion in the
birth of the Constitution, the participatory government and communitarian theory
in contemporary political philosophy, and the empirical perspective that religious values
are already informing judicial decision making. Id. at 455–67, 473–78.
4. See Ken Chitwood, The Interplay of Religion and Popular Culture in
Contemporary America, RELIGIOUS STUD. PROJECT (Mar. 12, 2016), https://www.religious
studiesproject.com/response/the-interplay-of-religion-and-popular-culture-in-contemporaryamerica/ [https://perma.cc/C8TZ-B7UK] (providing examples of religion’s reach into
popular culture).
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discussed in public.5 As the popular saying goes, “[n]ever discuss politics
or religion in polite company.”6 Although this might be the general sentiment
in modern times, some scholars believe that the idea of religion as a
separate subject matter7 is a relatively modern invention.8 Religion was
historically categorized not as a separate aspect of life, but intertwined
with life itself.9 Historians generally believe that the subject of religion
became separated from general life for legal and governmental purposes.10
Nonetheless, although religion may be a relatively modern category, the
legal world is faced with the predicament of navigating around the subject

5. A study found that about half of American adults seldom or never talk about
religion with people outside of their family, and four out of ten Americans say they seldom
or never discuss religion even with members of their immediate family. Many Americans
Don’t Argue About Religion—Or Even Talk About It, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Apr. 15, 2016),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/15/many-americans-dont-argue-aboutreligion-or-even-talk-about-it/ [https://perma.cc/LTM6-SEFV].
6. Leslie Sholly, The Politics of Email, LIFE IN EVERY LIMB (July 8, 2012),
https://lifeineverylimb.com/tag/etiquette/ [https://perma.cc/CFH8-EP2E]. Furthermore,
Judith Martin, columnist and author behind Miss Manners, concedes that the general rule
banning casual discussion of politics is sometimes thought to be “prissy” and may validly
be called a repression of free speech, but believes that these accusations may only have
validity if people knew how to express their opinions civilly and listen with open minds—
a feat that most people cannot manage. Judith Martin, Nicholas Ivor Martin & Jacobina
Martin, Keep Politics and Religion Out of the Conversation, UEXPRESS (Apr. 6, 2010),
https://www.uexpress.com/miss-manners/2010/4/6/keep-politics-and-religion-out-of
[https://perma.cc/V4W7-USS5].
7. Religious academics disagree on a definition of religion as a subject matter.
Michael Bergunder, What Is Religion? The Unexplained Subject Matter of Religious Studies,
26 METHOD & THEORY STUDY RELIGION 247–52 (2014) (discussing different theoretical
approaches to defining religion).
8. See Ninian Smart, Study of Religion, BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
topic/study-of-religion [https://perma.cc/EHH8-NU4D] (noting that the study of religion
emerged as a formal discipline during the 19th century); see also Paul J. Griffiths, The Very
Idea of Religion, F IRST THINGS (May 2000), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2000/
05/the-very-idea-of-religion [https://perma.cc/9RDC-83BF] (“[T]he idea that there is a
genus called ‘religion’ of which there are many species . . . [is] a modern invention.”).
9. Scholars suggest that the low importance of the word “religion” in ancient
civilizations implies that religion was not distinct from life, but simply fused with life
itself. See Griffiths, supra note 8.
10. See The First Amendment Says Nothing About “Separation of Church and
State” or a “Wall of Separation Between Church and State.” Where Did This Idea Come
From? Is It Really Part of the Law?, FREEDOM F. INST., https://www.freedomforum
institute.org/about/faq/the-first-amendment-says-nothing-about-separation-of-churchand-state-or-a-wall-of-separation-between-church-and-state-where-did-this-idea-come-fromis-it-really/ [https://perma.cc/2AU5-GBCX ].
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and forming appropriate legal jurisprudence.11 This dilemma is amplified
in an ongoing constitutional First Amendment debate exemplified by a
recent circuit split highlighting the dispute over the following question: Is
religion correctly classified as a subject matter or a viewpoint?12 This
distinction is relevant because the government may place restrictions on
religious speech only if religion is found to be a subject matter, not a
viewpoint.13
The Supreme Court has never answered the broad question of whether
religion always constitutes a viewpoint or a subject matter, but it has been
faced with the daunting task of categorizing some religious-based laws as
those proscribing religion as either a viewpoint or a subject matter.14
Using a laborious and fact-intensive test, the Court classified religion as a
viewpoint in all three cases where it was presented with such a question.15
Notwithstanding this precedent, the United States Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia Circuit in Archdiocese of Washington v. Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority found in 2018 that a guideline
prohibiting religious advertisements on buses was viewpoint neutral and
thus constituted a permissible subject matter regulation.16 This holding
implied that religion as a whole should be characterized as a subject
matter. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in Northeastern Pennsylvania Freethought Society v. County of Lackawanna

11. Courts often struggle to decide whether a claim, activity, organization, purpose,
or classification is religious. For a perspective on the struggle of courts to define religion
and an argument that courts should decide whether something is religious by comparison
with the indisputably religious, see generally Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in
Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 753 (1984).
12. Compare Archdiocese of Wash. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 897 F.3d
314, 325 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (classifying religion as a subject matter), with Ne. Pa. Freethought
Soc’y v. Cnty. of Lackawanna Transit Sys., 938 F.3d 424, 436 (3d Cir. 2019) (classifying
religion as a viewpoint).
13. See infra Section II.A.
14. For a discussion about a different line of Supreme Court cases which dealt not
with explicitly analyzing the presence of viewpoint discrimination, but instead analyzed
instances where schools punished students for wearing religious T-shirts, see generally
Kristi L. Bowman, Public School Students’ Religious Speech and Viewpoint Discrimination,
110 W. VA. L. REV. 187 (2007). The author argues that the Supreme Court has permitted
schools to engage in limited viewpoint discrimination due to the unique and distinctive
relationship established between schools and students, creating important interests and
allowing such discrimination. Id. at 211, 212, 215, 219.
15. See infra Section III.A; see also Bowman, supra note 14, at 211–12. The author
distinguished Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District and Good
News Club v. Milford Central School from the student T-shirt cases because the speech at
issues in Lamb’s Chapel and Good News Club belonged to community organizers, not the
actual students. Id. at 211. Thus, neither of those two cases engaged in the issue of viewpoint
discrimination in the context of the school as an educational setting. Id. at 212.
16. Archdiocese of Wash., 897 F.3d, at 322.
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Transit System, created a circuit split in 2019 when it found that functionally
the same guideline constituted unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.17
This circuit split created the issue identified herein: Is a ban on religious
advertisements—aimed at all religions equally—permissible because it
constitutes a restriction of a subject matter, or is it impermissible because
it constitutes restriction of a viewpoint? This narrow issue implies the
existence of a broader issue: Should religion as a whole be classified as a
subject matter or a viewpoint in order to avoid laborious and fact-intensive
inquiries into each particular law? This Comment aims to answer this
question through the lens of not only legal precedent, but policy perspectives
as well. This Comment advances the position that a ban on religious
advertisements constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination using
the fact-intensive analysis developed by the Court. Furthermore, this Comment
argues that religion should always be classified as a viewpoint—a lens
through which to discuss particular subjects—rather than as an entire subject
matter, in order to avoid fact-intensive tests and extensive litigation.
Part II will provide an overview of First Amendment jurisprudence by
discussing the forum analysis and its relevance, defining the types of
speech restrictions and rationale thereof, and providing a history of the
birth of the viewpoint discrimination principle. Then, Part III will provide
an analysis of the legal issue identified herein: Is a ban on religious
advertisements on buses a permissible subject matter regulation or an
impermissible viewpoint regulation under the First Amendment? Finally,
Part IV will conclude that a ban on religious advertisements on buses is
an impermissible viewpoint regulation under the First Amendment, and
that religion should always be broadly classified as a viewpoint.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The First Amendment announces, “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.”18 Although the Establishment Clause, Free Exercise Clause,
and Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment are all related to religion,19
17. Ne. Pa. Freethought Soc’y, 938 F.3d, at 436–37.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
19. For a foundational examination of the relationship between the religious liberty
clauses and the Free Speech Clause, see generally Carl H. Esbeck, Religion and the First
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only the Free Speech Clause is relevant to answer the legal question here—
whether a law banning religious advertisements on public buses constitutes
permissible subject matter discrimination or impermissible viewpoint
discrimination.
The Free Speech Clause protects the rights of the people to freely
express their opinions without censorship, restraint, or interference by the
government.20 This clause has been used by the Supreme Court to analyze
and critique those laws passed by various governmental entities that
restrict expression in any way.21 The Free Speech Clause implicates religion
when the government passes a law restricting religious expression.22
The Supreme Court has created guidelines to ascertain whether or not
such laws pass constitutional muster. First, the government-controlled
place of expressive activity must be classified as either a traditional public
forum, a designated public forum, or a non-public forum.23 Second, upon
a finding of non-public fora, the Court determines whether the law constitutes
permissible subject matter restriction or impermissible viewpoint restriction.24
Subject matter restrictions, but not viewpoint restrictions, are permissible
in non-public fora because the Court deems them less threatening to distort
the free marketplace of ideas.25
Section A will provide a brief background of the different types of fora
espoused by the Court and the restrictions on speech permissible therein.
Section B will define the viewpoint and subject matter principles and
analyze why this distinction developed and the purposes it served. Section
Amendment: Some Causes of the Recent Confusion, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883 (2001).
Carl Esbeck, a professor of law, believes that the religious clauses were not a vesting of
new power to restrain religion, but a “negative” on existing governmental power, and all
three of the clauses operate independently of each other so that it is impossible for any to
override the Free Speech Clause. Id. at 917–18. Scholars attempt to define religion in the
context of the religious liberty clauses. For an attempt to properly define religion using
historical, judicial, psychological, theological, and sociological contexts, see generally
Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defining Religion: The Struggle to Define Religion Under the First
Amendment and the Contributions and Insights of Other Disciplines of Study Including
Theology, Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and Anthropology, 83 N.D. L. REV. 123 (2007).
20. See Victoria L. Killion, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11072, The First Amendment:
Categories of Speech (2019).
21. See infra Section II.C. For a discussion of the historical meanings of the First
Amendment, see Jud Campbell, What Did the First Amendment Originally Mean?, RICH.
L. MAG. (July 9, 2018), https://lawmagazine.richmond.edu/features/article/-/15500/whatdid-the-first-amendment-originally-mean.html [https://perma.cc/2V8Z-LJ3X]. The author advances
the position that the founders thought that the First Amendment required Congress to restrict
speech only in promotion of the public good and guaranteed rules protecting expressive
freedom. Id.
22. See infra Section II.C.
23. See infra Section II.A.
24. See infra Section II.A.
25. See infra Section II.A.
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C will provide a discussion of the development of the viewpoint
discrimination principle through historical Supreme Court cases.
A. The Forum Analysis and Its Relevance
A forum under First Amendment jurisprudence is a place of speech, and
the forum in which a speaker speaks is relevant in ascertaining the
constitutionality of restrictions on speech.26 The First Amendment protects
the right to speak in different ways based on the place of speech. The
Supreme Court articulated a tripartite classification for government controlled places where expression may occur in Perry Education Association
v. Perry Local Educators’ Association.27
First, traditional public fora are those that have been traditionally “devoted
to assembly and debate.”28 Such places include public parks, sidewalks,
and other places created for citizens to assemble, “communicat[e] thoughts
between [one another], and discuss public questions.” 29 In such fora,
content-based restrictions on speech—which include both subject matter
and viewpoint restrictions—must satisfy strict scrutiny.30 Content-neutral
restrictions—restrictions on the time, place, and manner of speech—are
permissible if reasonable.31

26. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983) (“The
existence of a right of access to public property and the standard by which limitations upon
such a right must be evaluated differ depending on the character of the property at issue.”).
27. Id. at 45–46.
28. Id. at 45. Scholars argue that no clear-cut test emerged for determining when a
traditional public forum exists. See Michael J. Friedman, Dazed and Confused: Explaining
Judicial Determinations of Traditional Public Forum Status, 82 TUL. L. REV. 929, 930
(2008). The author used social science techniques to explain judicial determinations of
public forum status and found seven relevant factors:
(1) whether the property is perceived as a street, park, or sidewalk, (2) whether
the property is distinguishable from surrounding public spaces, and (3) proximity to
a seat of legislative or executive power. The judicial determinations were also
affected by the ways in which the property is used, including (1) extent of public
access, (2) historic use for discourse, (3) particularity of purpose, and (4) use as
a public thoroughfare or as a part of a transportation grid.
Id. at 969.
29. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496,
515 (1939)).
30. Id. (“[The state] must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.” (citing Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980))).
31. Id.
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Second, designated public fora are public property that the government
has opened for use by the public as a place for all types of expressive
activity.32 This type of forum is bound by the same standards as those
applying to the traditional public forum.33 A subset of the designated public
forum,34 the limited public forum, 35 is created when governments open
nonpublic fora, but limit expression to certain kinds of speakers or subjects.36
Strict scrutiny is applied to restrictions on speech that fall within the
designated category for which the forum has been opened.37
Third, non-public fora include “[p]ublic property which is not by tradition
or designation a forum for public communication.”38 In such fora, contentbased restrictions on speech are permissible as long as the law is “reasonable
and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials
oppose the speaker’s view.” 39 In other words, subject matter restrictions
are permissible and viewpoint restrictions are impermissible in non-public
fora. Other types of permissible restrictions on speech include those based
on mode of expression and speaker status, so long as such restrictions have
no viewpoint discrimination.40
As exemplified by these rules, the viewpoint versus subject matter
distinction is only relevant when a law has been passed in a non-public
forum. Thus, this Comment will focus on the non-public fora only because
they are the only areas where the issue identified herein is relevant.
B. Types of Speech Restrictions and Rationale for Distinctions
The constitutionality of restrictions on speech depends upon not only
the forum of the speech, but upon the type of restriction the government

32. Id.
33. Id. at 45–46.
34. Scholars argue that the distinction between designated and limited public fora
are ambiguous. See generally Ronnie J. Fischer, Comment, “What’s in a Name?”: An
Attempt to Resolve the “Analytic Ambiguity” of the Designated and Limited Public Fora,
107 DICK. L. REV. 639 (2003).
35. For an argument that the limited public forum doctrine is unworkable because
it is impossible for one to differentiate between a presumptively invalid content-based
restriction on speech and a legitimate adjustment of the content parameters that define the
forum, see generally Matthew D. McGill, Unleashing the Limited Public Forum: A Modest
Revision to a Dysfunctional Doctrine, 52 STAN. L. REV. 929 (2000).
36. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 100 v. City of N.Y.
Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 545 (2d Cir. 2002).
37. Id.
38. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
39. Id. (citing U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S.
114, 131 n.7 (1981)).
40. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 682 (1998) (finding
speech properly excluded on the basis of the speaker’s status).
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places on the speech as well. The two broad categories of speech restrictions
include content-based and content-neutral restrictions.41 First, content-neutral
restrictions limit speech without regard to the substance of the message
being conveyed.42 They include laws that “serve purposes unrelated to
the content of expression.”43 In other words, such laws have no bearing
on the ideas or views expressed.44 These types of laws are also known as
“‘time, place, and manner’ regulations”45 because they focus on the when,
how, and where of expression, rather than the what, who, or why.46 Content-

41. See R. George Wright, Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations of
Speech: A Distinction That Is No Longer Worth the Fuss, 67 FLA. L. REV. 2081, 2083
(2016).
42. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. For a perspective that content-neutral rules
established by the Court are hazy, see generally Jay Alan Sekulow & Erik M. Zimmerman,
Uncertainty Is the Only Certainty: A Five-Category Test to Clarify the Unsure Boundaries
Between Content-Based and Content-Neutral Restrictions on Speech, 65 EMORY L.J. 455
(2015). These scholars argue that five categories of laws should be subject to strict
scrutiny:
(1) The government’s actual purpose is to suppress speech based on its content
or viewpoint, or to impose subjective editorial control over content or viewpoint.
(2) The government interest that the law is intended to further relates to an aspect
of the direct or emotive communicative impact of regulated expression, rather
than the manner of its delivery. (3) The law, on its face, treats speakers differently
due to the content or viewpoint of their message, or excludes from its coverage
speech or conduct relating to different subject matter or viewpoints that pose
similar threats to the government’s asserted interests. (4) The actual or inevitable
effect of the law is to prevent speakers espousing certain messages from effectively
reaching their intended audience, such as by targeting a particular location or
manner of expression that is closely tied to one subject matter or viewpoint. (5)
The law lends itself to use for content- or viewpoint-discriminatory purposes, or
there is a realistic possibility that official suppression is afoot.
Id. at 457–58.
43. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
44. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994). See generally
Clay Calvert, Content-Based Confusion and Panhandling: Muddling a Weathered First
Amendment Doctrine Takes Its Toll on Society’s Less Fortunate, 18 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT.
249 (2015) (providing a discussion of content-neutrality in panhandling laws).
45. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (noting that
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations are permitted).
46. See Minch Minchin, The Content-Neutrality Doctrine Still Works, 67 FLA. L.
REV. F. 320, 322 (2015), http://www.floridalawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/Minchin_
Published.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EPN-AB5Y]. For a discussion that courts should completely
abandon the doctrine of content neutrality, see generally Wright, supra note 41. The author
argues that the distinction between content-based and content-neutral is no longer clear or
practical because judicial trends establish that content-based restrictions are no longer
subject to more demanding judicial scrutiny than content-neutral restrictions. Id. at 2082.
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neutral laws are subject to the “rational basis” inquiry and are seldom struck
down.47
Second, content-based laws proscribe speech based on the substance of
the message communicated. 48 Content-based regulations include both
subject matter-based and viewpoint-based regulations.49 The difference
between a regulation based on a subject matter or a viewpoint is tenuous.
A subject matter regulation intends to regulate speech on the basis of the
substance of the message.50 On the other hand, a viewpoint regulation
proscribes speech based on the particular position, ideology, perspective,
or viewpoint of the speaker. 51 Viewpoint discrimination is a subset of
content discrimination,52 which means that all viewpoint discrimination is
content discrimination, but not all content discrimination is viewpoint
discrimination—content discrimination includes subject matter discrimination
as well.
The viewpoint versus subject matter distinction is crucial in understanding
the constitutionality of laws in non-public fora.53 In such fora, viewpoint
discrimination is impermissible and subject matter discrimination is
permissible.54 In order to understand and correctly apply the viewpoint
discrimination principle, care must be taken to understand why the distinction
between content-based and content-neutral laws—as well as the distinction

47. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018) (“[I]t should come as no surprise
that the Court hardly ever strikes down a policy as illegitimate under rational basis scrutiny.”).
48. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537–38
(1980).
49. See id. at 537.
50. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (“The principal inquiry in
determining content neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.” (citing Clark v. Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984))).
51. Cambridge Christian Sch., Inc. v. Fla. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 942 F.3d 1215,
1241 (11th Cir. 2019).
52. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)
(“Viewpoint discrimination is thus an egregious form of content discrimination.”).
53. Some scholars believe that once determining that viewpoint discrimination
exists, courts find the law unconstitutional without further analysis required by the strict
scrutiny inquiry. See Maura Douglas, Comment, Finding Viewpoint Neutrality in Our
Constitutional Constellation, 20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 727, 728 (2018); Martin H. Redish,
Commercial Speech, First Amendment Intuitionism and the Twilight Zone of Viewpoint
Discrimination, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 67, 109 (2007) (arguing that modern cases establish
a per se rule of unconstitutionality when met with viewpoint discrimination); Elena Kagan,
Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 444 (1996) (arguing that courts invalidate viewpoint
discriminatory regulations without applying strict scrutiny as it would to content-based
regulations).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 24–25.
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between subject matter and viewpoint-based laws—emerged and what
purposes these distinctions served.
The Supreme Court is much more comfortable with content-neutral
laws rather than content-based laws.55 Content-neutral laws are generally
seen as justified on grounds not pertaining to the message of the speech,
but rather of the time, place, or manner of the speech.56 Typical purposes
of such laws are to control noise levels, mitigate public nuisances, or
establish appropriate and inappropriate places for speech.57 These types
of laws are generally upheld because they apply neutrally to all topics and
thus are less likely to unconstitutionally skew private discussion.58 Because
these types of laws treat all speakers equally, they are “relatively poor tools
for controlling public debate, and their very generality creates a substantial
political check that prevents them from being unduly burdensome.”59
Scholars have also suggested that because the broad coverage of such laws
makes them harder to enact, the Court respects and defers to the legislature’s
balancing of the costs and benefits in the enactment of such laws.60

55. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (“Our
precedents . . . apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage,
or impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.”); see also Leslie
Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint
Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595 (2003). The author advances that resolution
of the issue is murky because the Court often merges the content-based and viewpointbased inquiries. Id. at 596 (citing Turner, 512 U.S. at 643 (distinguishing content-based
from content neutral speech restriction by whether they “distinguish favored speech from
disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed”)). The problem of this
merging is that it makes it difficult to tell the different types of government action apart,
leading to a confused and outcome-driven doctrine. Id. at 597–98 (first citing Rosenberger,
515 U.S. at 831 (“[T]he distinction [between content and viewpoint discrimination] is not
a precise one.”); and then citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 741 (2000)).
56. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
57. See, e.g., id. at 792 (stating that the principal purpose of the regulation was to
control noise levels at the park).
58. See Jacobs, supra note 55, at 598.
59. Turner, 512 U.S. at 676 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
60. Alan E. Brownstein, Rules of Engagement for Cultural Wars: Regulating
Conduct, Unprotected Speech, and Protected Expression in Anti-Abortion Protests,
29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 553, 609–10 (1996). However, the author advances the notion that
content-neutral laws may sometimes be as dangerous as content-based laws. Id. at 594–
96 (“A law banning picketing of any kind in front of a manufacturing establishment is
content-neutral, but probably almost as disadvantageous to union speech as a similar law
prohibiting only picketing related to labor disputes.”).
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On the other hand, content-based laws are deemed much more constitutionally
dangerous. First, because content-based laws treat speech differently based
on its content, they distort the ordinary workings of the “marketplace of ideas,”
leaving the public with an incomplete perception of society based on
the content of speech.61 As a result, content-based restrictions undermine two
principal purposes of free speech: They “distort the search for truth” and
distort the way citizens make decisions on matters of public policy because
they limit discourse of only certain types of speech while allowing other
types to prevail.62
Within the realm of content-based laws, viewpoint-based laws are
deemed more suspicious than subject matter-based laws for a variety of
reasons. First, the danger of distortion of the marketplace of ideas is more
severe in cases of viewpoint discrimination than subject matter discrimination.
The Court repeatedly emphasized the distortion that may occur to the
marketplace of ideas if viewpoint discriminatory laws were deemed
constitutional.63
A second possible explanation of the Court’s anti-viewpoint-discrimination
approach is the Court’s belief that it is impermissible for the government
to restrict speech because it disapproves of the message that is conveyed.
The Court famously articulated this reasoning by stating that, “[i]f there
is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word
or act their faith therein.”64 The reference to “opinion” in this reasoning
exemplifies the Court’s fear of viewpoint discrimination because of the
danger that governments will force the public to abide by certain viewpoints
deemed correct by the state.

61. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1766 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment). For an argument that the Court’s reasoning lacked
analytical clarity in attempting to distinguish subject matter regulations, see generally
Geoffrey R. Stone, Restriction of Speech Because of Its Content: The Peculiar Case of
Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81 (1978). The author advances a new
framework of dividing the subject matter restrictions into two categories: (1) “subjectmatter restrictions defined in terms of speech about a specific issue”; and (2) “[those
consisting of] subject-matter restrictions that are directed against broad classes of speech,
cutting across a wide spectrum of issues.” Id. at 109, 112.
62. Stone, supra note 61, at 101.
63. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy states, “[The viewpoint discrimination
principle] protects the right to create and present arguments for particular positions in
particular ways, as the speaker chooses. By mandating [a particular viewpoint], the law . . . might
silence dissent and distort the marketplace of ideas.” Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1766 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
64. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

542

KUKHARENOK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 59: 531, 2022]

9/27/2022 2:59 PM

Bus Bans on Religious Advertisements
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

The reason why this danger exists in the first place stems from the
familiar premise articulated by the Court in 1919 that free speech seeks to
promote the discovery of truth.65 This premise rests upon the assumption
that the search for truth is more fruitful when relying on “the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,” rather than
relying on government censorship.66 Furthermore, this danger also stems
from the principle that allowing individuals to make decisions for themselves
is crucial to “produce a more capable citizenry”67 and enhance “individual
dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.”68 This emphasis
on individual autonomy is another reason why the Court so favors government
impartiality and is thus so concerned with governmental proscription of views
it deems unacceptable.
C. Development of the Viewpoint Discrimination Principle
The viewpoint discrimination principle can be traced all the way back
to 1939 when the Supreme Court expressed fear that an ordinance governing
issuance of public street speaking permits could “be made the instrument
of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national affairs.”69
This fear of censoring particular perspectives exemplifies the very heart
of the viewpoint discrimination principle.
Four years later, the Supreme Court articulated this point further in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette when it struck down a
school board’s mandatory flag salute rule and showed concern that the
law would allow the government to identify correct and incorrect opinions
in matters such as politics, nationalism, and religion.70 This fear of government
intervention into individual viewpoints by restricting some opinions and
65. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
66. Id.
67. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
68. Id.
69. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939) (emphasis added).
70. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). Although
Barnette held that requiring students to salute the flag and recite the Pledge of Allegiance
infringes upon their rights to free speech, lower courts are divided on the “question of
whether a state may require teachers to lead their classes in the Pledge of Allegiance.”
John J. Concannon III, Note, The Pledge of Allegiance and the First Amendment,
23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1019, 1020 (1989). The author argues that the government will be
unable to demonstrate the prerequisite compelling interest for upholding a mandatory
Pledge and that it cannot achieve this interest through less restrictive means. Id. at 1046–
47.
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allowing others provides the core of the early justification for the Court’s
growing hostility towards viewpoint discrimination.
The Court next addressed viewpoint discrimination in 1969, stating that
the government must show something beyond the “desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular
viewpoint” to create laws restricting speech.71 This reasoning was built on
the idea that viewpoint discrimination occurs when the government aims
to suppress one side of a particular viewpoint—usually an unpopular one.
Cohen v. California72 further supported this principle.73 The Court, in
striking down a conviction under a statute that prohibited offensive conduct,
discussed “the usual rule that governmental bodies may not prescribe the
form or content of individual expression.” 74 Although this language
articulated the Court’s concern with content-based laws, the Court expressed
further worry that governments may censor particular words under the
“guise [of] banning the expression of unpopular views.”75 Banning unpopular
views was deemed so dangerous because it conflicted with the principle
that a “capable citizenry” values individual viewpoints and allows citizens
to decide which views to voice. 76 The Court emphasized the inability
to ascertain any social benefit that might result from the “grave” action of
censoring unpopular views.77 The notion that minimal governmental restraints
into individual viewpoints enhances society as a whole provided justification
for the adoption of the viewpoint discrimination principle.78 This justification
serves useful in ascertaining modern viewpoint discrimination cases today.
The Court continued its emphasis on allowing all points of view an
equal opportunity to be heard in Police Department of Chicago v.
Mosley.79 In Mosley, the Supreme Court stated that an ordinance was
unconstitutional because it described “permissible picketing in terms of
its subject matter.”80 Although this case was decided on subject matter

71. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
72. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
73. See id. at 24.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 26 (“Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular
words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views.”).
76. See id. at 24.
77. Id. at 26. For an article revisiting and reexamining Cohen, see generally
Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Looking Back at Cohen v. California: A 40-Year Retrospective
from Inside the Court, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 651 (2012). The author concedes that
the motive of the law in Cohen was admirable—to protect innocent people from indecent,
distasteful speech. Id. at 686. However, allowing the government to enforce such restrictions
would turn citizens into “simple agents of the State.” Id.
78. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
79. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
80. Id. at 95.
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restriction grounds rather than viewpoint discrimination grounds, the Court
used language indicating concern with viewpoint discrimination as well:
[G]overnment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content. To permit the continued building of our politics and
culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed
the right to express any thought, free from government censorship. . . . [G]overnment
may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but
deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial
views. . . . [The] government must afford all points of view an equal opportunity
to be heard.81

By distinguishing between a message and the ideas espoused in the
message, and between acceptable and controversial views, the Court began
to articulate the distinction between viewpoint discrimination and subject
matter discrimination. Plainly, all points of view, including the less favored,
must be given an equal opportunity to be heard.
In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, a city sold advertising space on a
public transit system only to purveyors of goods and services, and refused
to sell space for political advertisements.82 Finding that the advertising
space constituted a nonpublic forum, 83 the Court upheld the restriction
because the policy aimed to “minimize chances of abuse, the appearance
of favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a captive audience.”84 This
holding implied that the Court believed politics were better characterized
as a subject matter, rather than a viewpoint.85
In Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. v. Public Service
Commission of New York, a regulation prohibited discussion of nuclear
power in bill inserts.86 The Court rejected the argument that the law was
constitutional because it applied to all discussion of nuclear power, pro or

81. Id. at 95–96.
82. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 300 (1974).
83. Id. at 301–02.
84. Id. at 304.
85. Scholars dispute this finding. See Wojciech Sadurski, Does the Subject Matter?
Viewpoint-Neutrality and Freedom of Speech, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 315 (1997).
The author discussed the irony resulting from characterizing politics as a subject matter
and religion as a viewpoint because this characterization would result in politics “receiv[ing]
inferior protection compared to religious speech, notwithstanding numerous declarations
that political speech ranks highest on the hierarchy of speech under the First Amendment.”
Id. at 327 n.39.
86. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 532 (1980).
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con.87 The Court implicitly suggested that the law was not viewpoint
discriminatory, but rather subject matter discriminatory, by stating that
“[t]he First Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends
not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of
public discussion of an entire topic.”88 This statement suggested that the
appropriate test for ascertaining viewpoint discrimination was whether the
law bans only one side of a particular debate. However, this test was later
abandoned by the Supreme Court’s holding in Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the University of Virginia.89
A statute in Carey v. Brown banned picketing in front of residences, but
exempted peaceful picketing involving labor disputes.90 In a footnote, Justice
Brennan noted that it was irrelevant that the ordinance discriminated on
the basis of subject matter rather than the speaker’s viewpoint because
both subject matter and viewpoint discrimination were impermissible.91
This aimed to further strengthen the notion that subject matter discrimination
and viewpoint discrimination were two separate ideas.
In 1983, the Court articulated the tri-part forum distinction analysis in
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association.92 In
finding that the interschool mail system was nonpublic, the Court upheld
a restriction on a rival union from using the mail system as viewpoint neutral
because there was “no indication that the School Board intended to discourage
one viewpoint and advance another,” and the exclusive access policy was
based on the parties’ status instead of their views.93
87. Id. at 537. The Court based its holding—that a state may not bar a utility from
including a political message with its bills—on the fact that the speech involved a political
message, not commercial speech. Id. at 539–40. This type of content-based restriction
triggered strict scrutiny by the Court. See R. Randall Kelso, Clarifying Viewpoint
Discrimination in Free Speech Doctrine, 52 IND. L. REV. 355, 421 (2019). On the other
hand, classifying speech as commercial speech has wholly different implications. Id. at
419. The commercial speech doctrine has a four-part analysis: First, the “[Court] must
determine whether the [speech] is protected by the First amendment” and for commercial
speech to apply, it “must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.” Id. (citing Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 577, 566 (1098)). Second,
“[the Court] ask[s] whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.” Id. If both
questions are answered positively, “[the Court] must determine whether the regulation
directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive
than necessary to serve that interest.” Id.
88. Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 537.
89. See infra Section III.A.
90. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 457 (1980).
91. Id. at 462 n.6 (quoting Consol. Edison, 447 U.S. at 537).
92. See infra text accompanying notes 26–27.
93. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983)
(“Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in access
on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity.”). The Court in Perry deferred heavily
to the wisdom of the school board in the determination that no such viewpoint
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In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the restriction was viewpointbased because only one particular group was denied from using the system,
and thus it was created to deny rival unions with differing points of view
access to effective communication channels.94 The majority responded by
noting that the restriction applied to all outside unions and that “there
[was] no indication in the record that the policy was motivated by a desire
to suppress [rival unions’] views.”95 However, as became clear later, the
fact that a restriction applies to all sides of a topic does not preclude it from
being viewpoint discriminatory.96 Furthermore, requiring courts to ascertain
individual motivations behind all policies advanced by lawmakers is not
an efficient and effective use of judicial resources.
The next case to evaluate viewpoint discrimination was Pacific Gas &
Electric Co. v. Public Utility Commission.97 The Commission mandated
that PG&E allow an advocacy group, Toward Utility Rate Normalization
(TURN), to include content in PG&E’s newsletter four times per year.98
The Commission required that TURN state views that were different from
PG&E’s.99 The order was invalidated because it “select[ed] the other speakers
on the basis of their viewpoints.”100 In other words, a government may not
force a speaker to adopt a particular message.
In Texas v. Johnson, the Court invalidated a statute that made it illegal
to desecrate a venerated object, including a flag.101 The Court stated that
discrimination exists. Id. Scholars critique this finding on the basis that the Court
“narrowly focused on the character of the public property and passively scrutinized the
justifications for the exclusive access policy.” See David C. Sarnacki, Case Note, Perry
Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983), 67 MARQ. L. REV. 772,
784 (1984). The author concludes that the consequences of such deference lead to viewpoint
discrimination and suggests that state legislatures should enact statutes guaranteeing teacher
unions equal access to communication channels. Id.
94. Perry, 460 U.S. at 64–65 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]he intent to discriminate
can be inferred from the effect of the policy, which is to deny an effective channel of
communication to the respondents, and from other facts in the case.”).
95. Id. at 50 n.9 (majority opinion).
96. See Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints from Olympus, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 697, 703–
04 (1996) (noting that it is “hardly relevant to viewpoint discrimination” that a law does
not prefer one side over another).
97. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
98. Id. at 6.
99. See id. at 6–7.
100. Id. at 20–21.
101. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989). For a discussion of flag
desecration laws, see generally S. Kathryn Spruill, Comment, Old Glory and Flag Protection
Legislation: Can Congress Wrap Itself in the Flag Without Getting Burned?, 95 DICK. L.
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the principle that “the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable”
is a “bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment.”102 Although
the Court did not decide the case on viewpoint grounds, the majority noted
in a footnote that “surely one’s attitude toward the flag and its referents is
a viewpoint.”103 This suggested that patriotism constituted a viewpoint,
rather than a subject matter.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul further articulated the distinction between
content-neutrality and viewpoint-neutrality.104 The Court stated that content
discrimination involved the “entire class of speech.”105 On the other hand,
viewpoint discrimination was defined as “hostility—or favoritism—towards
the underlying message expressed.”106 The ordinance at issue applied only
to fighting words that insult or provoke violence “on the basis of race,
color, creed, religion or gender.”107 Because fighting words that argued
in favor of racial, religious, and gender equality would be lawful under the
ordinance, and fighting words that that opposed racial, religious, and gender
equality would be implicated, the ordinance was deemed viewpoint
discriminatory.108 The Court stated that “[the city] has no such authority
to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other
to follow Marquis of Queensbury Rules.”109 Namely, allowing only one

REV. 407 (1991). After the case was decided, there was a widespread plea for a constitutional
amendment permitting governments to ban desecration of the flag. Id. at 410. When that
did not work, Democrats put forth the Flag Protection Act of 1989, which would protect
the physical integrity of the flag. Id. at 412. However, the Supreme Court found the law
unconstitutional. Id. at 420 (quoting United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317 (1990)).
Another constitutional amendment was introduced after but was defeated in the House. Id.
at 421–22. The author suggested that Congress was correct in defeating the constitutional
amendments because the amendments would open the door for further amendments anytime an
“emotional, inflammatory dispute arises between . . . citizens and the Supreme Court.” Id.
at 427. Although flag desecration laws prohibit some of the most unpopular and dislikable
political speech, flag desecration is expressive in nature, which makes striking down such
laws difficult for the Court to justify. Id.
102. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414.
103. Id. at 413 n.9.
104. R.A.V., v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
105. Id. at 388.
106. See id. at 386.
107. Id. at 380 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., BIAS-MOTIVATED CRIME ORDINANCE
Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)).
108. Id. at 391–92.
109. Id. at 392. R.A.V. was decided on purely First Amendment grounds. See id.
For a perspective that the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments should have been
considered, see generally Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V.
v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992). The author advances that the hate speech
and symbols, such as burning crosses, constitute badges of servitude that may be prohibited
under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 155. The Court could have found
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side of a debate to speak constituted viewpoint discrimination. However,
the limitation on only one side of a debate is one possible form of viewpoint
discrimination, but it is not the only possible form, as exemplified in the
next case.
In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., a
charity drive limited participation to agencies which met certain criteria.110
The Court found that the government violates the Constitution when it
“denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view [a speaker]
espouses on an otherwise includible subject.”111 Thus, the second type of
viewpoint discrimination was born: Not only does viewpoint discrimination
arise when one particular side of a debate is silenced, but it arises also
when any position taken on otherwise allowable topics of discussion is
silenced. This principle added a completely new level of complexity
to the otherwise straightforward notion advanced prior to this decision.
Prior to Cornelius, the Court was concerned only with whether or not a
particular side of a debate or subject was silenced.112 After Cornelius, an
entirely new analysis was required—inquiry into permissible subjects
and determination of whether the law restricts any viewpoints of otherwise
permissible subjects.
In Walter v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., the Court characterized
license plates as government speech, bypassing the viewpoint discrimination
analysis. 113 In dissent, Justices Alito, Scalia, and Kennedy argued that an
ordinance rejecting Confederate flag license plate messages was “blatant”

that the burning cross was a badge of the slavery system, which the government is
authorized to abolish. Id. (quoting The Civil Rights Case, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
110. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 792, 795
(1985).
111. Id. at 806 (emphasis added).
112. See infra Section III.A.
113. Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 576 U.S. 200, 219–20
(2015). This case was decided on government speech grounds and government speech is
not subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 207–09 (“We have therefore refused ‘to hold that the
Government unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to
fund a program dedicated to advance certain permissible goals, because the program
in advancing those goals necessarily discourages alternative goals.’” (quoting Rust v. Sullivan,
500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991))).
For an article arguing that former president Donald Trump’s Twitter account should
have been classified as government speech instead of speech made in a designated public
forum, see generally Lauren Beausoleil, Comment, Is Trolling Trump a Right or a Privilege?:
The Erroneous Finding in Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University v.
Trump, 60 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. II.-31, II.-44 to -46 (2019).
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viewpoint discrimination because Texas only rejected those designs that
the public would find offensive.114 This argument exemplified the use of
the classic viewpoint discrimination determination—whether one particular
side or viewpoint was silenced.
The Court continued its discussion of the anti-viewpoint-discrimination
principle in 2017 in Matal v. Tam.115 A federal statute, the “disparagement
clause,” prohibited registration of trademarks that disparage, bring into
contempt, or disrepute any “persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs,
or national symbols.”116 Although the clause implicated all sides of every
possible issue, it was found viewpoint discriminatory because it denied
registration to any offensive trademark.117 The Court noted “time and again”
that speech may not be prohibited merely because it may be offensive to
some.118
Justice Kennedy, in his four-Justice concurrence, built on the test first
articulated in Cornelius and stated that the test for viewpoint discrimination
was “whether—within the relevant subject category—the government has
singled out a subset of messages for disfavor based on the views expressed.”119
Applying this test to Matal, Justice Kennedy found the relevant subject
matter was “persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national
symbols.” 120 Within that category, positive or benign trademarks were
permissible, whereas derogatory ones were not, which Kennedy thought
was “the essence of viewpoint discrimination.”121 In other words, censoring
by allowing only one type of view about a subject constituted viewpoint
discrimination.122 Kennedy finished with another summary of the viewpoint
neutrality principle:
The First Amendment’s viewpoint neutrality principle protects more than the
right to identify with a particular side. It [also] protects the right to create and
present arguments for particular positions in particular ways, as the speaker
chooses. By mandating positivity, the law here might silence dissent and distort
the marketplace of ideas.123

114. Walker, 576 U.S. at 223, 234 (Alito, J., dissenting).
115. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
116. Id. at 1753 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)).
117. Id. at 1763 (“Giving offense is a viewpoint.”).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1766 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
120. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a)).
121. Id. (noting that imposing restrictions on certain trademark names “reflects the
Government’s disapproval of a subset of messages it finds offensive”).
122. Id.
123. Id. Scholars advance that this holding is a sharp “departure from long prevailing
U.S. [federal law], as well as the rest of the world, where most countries have some form
of prohibition against the registration of ‘immoral’ marks.” Mark Sommers & Naresh
Kilaru, The Supreme Court’s Tam Decision: Federally Registered Offensive Trademarks,
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The Court revisited another provision of the Trademark Act in 2019 in
Iancu v. Brunetti.124 The provision prohibited “immoral” and “scandalous”
trademarks.125 The Court defined viewpoint discrimination by noting that
the “government may not discriminate against speech based on ideas or
opinions it conveys.”126 Comparing this case to Matal, the Court found
viewpoint discrimination because the provision “disfavor[ed] certain
ideas.”127 The Court specified that the provision distinguished between
two opposed sets of ideas—those aligned with moral standards and those
hostile to them; those inducing society’s approval and those not. 128
Because the provision favored the former set of ideas and disfavored the
latter, the Court found it viewpoint discriminatory.129
III. ANALYSIS: RELIGION IS A VIEWPOINT
Religion is more aptly characterized as a viewpoint. Section A will
provide a summary of relevant Supreme Court precedent that supports this
assertion, including Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District, Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia,
and Good News Club v. Milford Central School. Section B will discuss
the recent circuit split ascertaining whether a law banning religious
advertisements on buses is a permissible subject matter restriction or an
impermissible viewpoint restriction before concluding that the Third Circuit
was correct in holding that religion constitutes a viewpoint. Section C
FINNEGAN (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/articles/the-supremecourts-tam-decision-federally-registered-offensive-trademarks.html [https://perma.cc/
Q6F2-MUFR]. The authors advance the proposition that as a result of this decision, the
arbiter of unsavory marks “is no longer the courts or the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
but the commercial marketplace” in the form of “commercial alienation, blowback, and
public outrage.” Id.
124. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019).
125. Id. at 2297.
126. Id. at 2299.
127. Id. at 2297.
128. Id. at 2300.
129. Id. Some suggest that the implications of the case leave open a roadmap for
legislative action barring registration of obscene, vulgar, or profane marks because the
dissenters expressly indicated that such provisions would withstand First Amendment
challenges. See Tim Lince, Iancu v. Brunetti Ruling – Trademark Community Has Its Say
on Implications of Momentous US Supreme Court Decision, WORLD TRADEMARK REV.
(June 25, 2019), https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/enforcement-and-litigation/iancu-vbrunetti-ruling-trademark-community-has-its-say-implications [https://perma.cc/U9QN7L4J].

551

KUKHARENOK.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

9/27/2022 2:59 PM

will provide a discussion of why religion should always be classified as a
viewpoint.
A. Relevant Supreme Court Precedent
Decided in 1993, Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District was the first case to tackle viewpoint discrimination in the religious
sphere.130 In Lamb’s Chapel, New York law permitted the use of school
property for “social, civic, or recreational uses.”131 A school board added
the regulation that “the school premises shall not be used by any group for
religious purposes.”132 A church wanted to screen a film on school property
that dealt with family and child-rearing issues, including urging return to
traditional, Christian values.133
The Court explained that “the First Amendment forbids the government
to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the
expense of others.”134 Even though the law treated all religions alike by
banning all religious purposes, the Court found that the “critical question”
was whether the rule “discriminate[d] on the basis of viewpoint to permit
school property to be used for the presentation of all views about family
issues and child rearing except those dealing with the subject matter from
a religious standpoint.”135 The Court invoked the test from Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. to advance the rule
that banning points of view about otherwise permissible subjects constituted
viewpoint discrimination.136 Thus, because a film about child rearing and
family values would be otherwise permitted under New York law, a ban
on a film presenting these same ideas “from a religious perspective”
would be viewpoint discriminatory.137
130. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993)
(applying the Cornelius viewpoint discrimination test to a statute regulating religion).
131. Id. at 387.
132. Id. (quoting Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 57a, Lamb’s Chapel
v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (No. 91-2024)).
133. Id. at 387–88.
134. Id. at 394 (quoting City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 804 (1984)).
135. Id. at 393. For a discussion about the effect of Lamb’s Chapel on the modern
forum analysis, see generally Ralph D. Mawdsley, Lamb’s Chapel Revisited: A Mixed
Message on Establishment of Religion, Forum and Free Speech, 101 EDUC. L. REP. 531
(1995).
136. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806
(1985) (noting viewpoint discrimination exists when denying access to a speaker’s point
of view on an “otherwise includible subject”).
137. See Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 393–94. For discussions on the constitutional
conflict between the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause established in Lamb’s
Chapel, see Timothy K. Hall, Casenote, Constitutional Conflict: The Establishment Clause
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This case signified the non-intuitive idea that religion as a whole can be
classified as a viewpoint rather than a subject matter. Although on the
surface, religion, especially when it encompasses all religions, appears to
be a general subject matter, the Court developed the idea that religion can
be a lens or viewpoint through which other subjects are discussed.
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia built on
this reasoning.138 In this case, a university authorized payments for the
printing costs of a variety of student publications, but withheld payments
for publications about “religious activit[ies]” that implicated belief in any
deity.139 An organization wanted to publish a magazine “of philosophical
and religious expression.”140 The magazine’s “Christian viewpoint” was
evident in the journals’ mission in offering a Christian perspective on
personal and community issues.141 The Court stated that speech regulation is
unconstitutional when “the specific motivating ideology or the opinion or
perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”142 Speaking
about religion broadly, the Court stated:
It is . . . something of an understatement to speak of religious thought and
discussion as just a viewpoint, as distinct from a comprehensive body of thought.
The nature of our origins and destiny and their dependence upon the existence of
a divine being have been subjects of philosophic inquiry throughout human
history. . . . Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but it also provides, as it did
here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of
subjects may be discussed and considered.143

Applying this idea to the facts, the Court found that the law prohibited a
religious perspective on the otherwise allowable subjects of personal and

Meets the Free Speech Clause in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District, 45 MERCER L. REV. 875 (1994); Mawdsley, supra note 135, at 536–43.
138. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 820 (1995).
For a discussion that the Court in Rosenberger “abandoned that traditional approach by
conflating secular speech and religious speech under the First Amendment; by treating
religious speech as simply another ‘view point,’” see Barbara K. Bucholtz, What Goes
Around, Comes Around: Legal Ironies in an Emergent Doctrine for Preserving Academic
Freedom and the University Mission, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 311, 319 (2007). For a
contradictory discussion about the “praiseworthy” nature of the Court’s reasoned and sound
opinion in Rosenberger, see The Supreme Court, 1994 Term—Leading Cases, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 210, 214–20 (1995).
139. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 825.
140. Id. (citation omitted).
141. Id. at 826.
142. Id. at 829.
143. Id. at 831.
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community issues.144 The Court dismissed the dissent’s argument that
barring the entire topic of religion did not constitute viewpoint discrimination,
stating that silencing all religious speech simply means that debate “is
skewed in multiple ways.”145
Scholars have criticized Rosenberger because the Court stated that
religion was not “just a viewpoint,” yet “characterized [it] as a viewpoint
for the purposes of th[e] decision.”146 Wojciech Sadurski, a professor of
law, argued that Rosenberger expanded the viewpoint discrimination
principle too far because even the “most directly proselytizing talk about
religion . . . can always be characterized as being about something else
(salvation, peace of mind, human perfection, child rearing, community
duties), with ‘religion’ providing merely a ‘perspective.’”147 However, perhaps
that is exactly what the Court in Rosenberger aimed to do—permanently
classify religion as a viewpoint.148
Finally, Good News Club v. Milford Central School concluded the
Supreme Court’s discussion of religion in the viewpoint discrimination
context.149 A New York law authorized school boards to allow use of
school property for “instruction in any branch of education, learning or
the arts” and “social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainment
events and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community.”150
However, a community use policy prohibited use of facilities “by any
individual or organization for religious purposes.”151 The Good News
144. Id. (“University [did] not exclude religion as a subject matter but select[ed] for
disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints.”). For
a prediction that Rosenberger offers little to the body of free speech jurisprudence beyond
the narrow facts of that case, see Robert L. Waring, Wide Awake or Half-Asleep? Revelations
from Jurisprudential Tailings Found in Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 17 N. ILL.
U. L. REV. 223, 260–61 (1997).
145. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831–32. The dissent argued that because the law
applied to all religions, and even atheism, it denied funding for the entire subject matter of
religion. See id. at 898 (Souter, J., dissenting). In other words, the dissent believed that
the law applied not to those who wished to discuss general issues from religious perspectives, but
religious conversation and observances as a whole. Id.
146. See Sadurski, supra note 85, at 326.
147. Id. at 326–27 (emphasis omitted).
148. See infra Section III.C.
149. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). For a discussion
about Good News Club in the context of the Establishment Clause, see generally Rebecca
A. Valk, Note, Good News Club v. Milford Central School: A Critical Analysis of the
Establishment Clause as Applied to Public Education, 17 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
347 (2003).
150. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 102 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at D1, Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (No. 992036)).
151. Id. at 103 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 150,
at D2).
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Club, a private Christian organization for kids, sought to hold weekly
meetings in the school cafeteria for singing songs, hearing Bible lessons,
and memorizing scripture.152
Because the policy was interpreted by the school to allow any group
that “promote[s] the moral and character development of children,” and
the Club taught morals and character development to children, the Court
found that the guideline constituted viewpoint discrimination.153 The
Court stated that even if something is “quintessentially religious” or “decidedly
religious in nature,” that does not mean that it cannot be characterized as
advancing non-religious messages from a religious viewpoint.154 Thus,
the Court held that “speech discussing otherwise permissible subjects cannot
be excluded . . . on the ground that the subject is discussed from a religious
viewpoint.”155
B. The Recent Circuit Split and Analysis Thereof
The issues the Court met in Rosenberger, Good News Club, and Lamb’s
Chapel are still prevalent today. The federal circuits are currently split on
the issue of whether bans on religious advertisements on public buses constitute
permissible subject matter discrimination or impermissible viewpoint
discrimination. The D.C. Circuit concluded that the ban on religious

152. Id. (citation omitted).
153. Id. at 108–09 (quoting Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 9, Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502 (2000) (No. 98-9494)). The Club taught morals and
character development to children from a religious perspective. Id. at 110.
154. Id. at 111 (“We disagree that something that is ‘quintessentially religious’ or
‘decidedly religious in nature’ cannot also be characterized properly as the teaching of morals
and character development from a particular viewpoint.”).
155. Id. at 112. Dissenting Justices Souter and Ginsburg argued that Good News
Club was distinguishable from Lamb’s Chapel because the Club intended to use the
premises not for the discussion of a subject from a religious point of view, “but for an
evangelical service of worship calling children to commit themselves in an act of Christian
conversion.” Id. at 138 (Souter, J., dissenting). Scholars have also picked up on this point
and wondered whether any possible distinction exists between “a group primarily focused
on worship or evangelism and a group primarily focused on teaching morals from a
religious perspective.” Jason E. Manning, Comment, Good News Club v. Milford Central
School: Viewpoint Discrimination or Endorsement of Religion?, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
833, 880 (2003); see also Jacobs, supra note 55, at 597–98 (noting the Court’s inconsistent
approaches to the determination of viewpoint discrimination). For a closer look at the
possible implications of Good News Club, see generally John E. Dunsford, A Closer Look
at Good News v. Milford: What Are the Implications? (Stay Tuned), 25 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 577 (2002).
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advertisements was not viewpoint discriminatory, and was simply subject
matter discriminatory. The Third Circuit, however, found that the ban on
religious advertisements constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination.
1. The D.C. Circuit Finds Permissible Subject Matter Discrimination—
This Analysis Strays from Supreme Court Precedent
In Archdiocese of Washington v. Washington Metro Area Transit Authority,
decided in 2018, the Catholic Archdiocese brought an action against the
Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority (WMTA).156 The WMTA
closed its advertising space on buses to “advertisements that promote or
oppose any religion, religious practice or belief.”157 The Archdiocese
sought to place an ad on the exterior of WMTA’s buses that “depict[ed] a
starry night and the silhouettes of three shepherds and sheep on a hill
facing a bright shining star high in the sky, along with the words ‘Find the
Perfect Gift,’” and a web address and social media hashtag promoting the
Catholic Church.158
The D.C. Circuit began by finding that WMTA’s advertisement space
constituted a nonpublic forum.159 Thus, the restriction would be upheld if
it constituted permissible subject matter restriction.160 The Archdiocese
contended that the law was impermissibly viewpoint discriminatory because
it suppressed religious viewpoints on otherwise permissible subjects.161
The church apparently wished to address topics such as charitable giving,
Christmas, opening hours, and places to visit—topics on which WMTA
allowed non-religious messages.162
The D.C. Circuit disagreed, stating that the guideline did not “exclude
religious viewpoints but rather proscribe[d] advertisements on the entire
subject matter of religion.”163 Finding the commercial nature of the forum
relevant,164 the court stated that “[t]hese contentions [were] unpersuasive
156. Archdiocese of Wash. v. Wash. Metro Area Transit Auth., 897 F.3d 314, 318
(D.C. Cir. 2018).
157. Id. at 320 (quoting WASH. METRO. AREA TRANSIT AUTH., GUIDELINES GOVERNING
COMMERCIAL ADVERTISING (2015), https://www.wmata.com/about/records/public_docs/
upload/Advertising_Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LK4-GHE9]).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 322–24.
160. See id. at 322.
161. Id. at 325.
162. Id. at 328.
163. Id. at 325.
164. See id. at 323. In a Ninth Circuit case decided in 1999, an advertiser sued
a school district because of the school’s refusal to post a paid advertisement containing the
Ten Commandments along the school’s fence. DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist.,
196 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 1999). The court found that the refusal to post the sign did not
constitute viewpoint discrimination in light of the forum’s reservation for commercial
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because the subjects” were “either not subjects within the forum or [were]
not subjects on which [the church has] shown they could not speak.”165
The court stated that the challenged ad was not “primarily or recognizably
about charitable giving . . . opening hours or places to visit,” but instead
was a religious ad urging viewers to attend mass at Catholic churches.166
Thus, because the ad was evocative of the “saving grace of Christ,” which
was not a permissible subject of the forum, the restriction did not constitute
viewpoint discrimination.167
The D.C. Circuit’s reasoning strays from Supreme Court precedent.
First, in upholding the ban, the D.C. Circuit found convincing that the
guideline prohibited religious speech in “clear, broad categories” and that
lawmakers were not tasked with deciding which religious advertisements
should be permissible.168 However, although Rosenberger suggested that
a broad prohibition on religious speech as a subject may be viewpoint
neutral,169 the Court in Good News Club foreclosed that argument, stating
that even if something was “quintessentially religious” or “decidedly religious
in nature,” it is still able to be characterized as advancing non-religious

speech. See id. at 969. “DiLoreto’s sign [did] not advertise, or even mention, a business.”
Id. Furthermore, the ad did not “address[] otherwise-permissible subjects from a religious
perspective; it set[] forth the Ten Commandments.” Id.
165. Archdiocese of Wash., 897 F.3d at 328–29.
166. Id. at 329.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 325. Laws which leave application discretion in the hands of lawmakers
are more suspect than those without such discretion because human biases, conscious or
not, are always at play. Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and
Standards, 92 IND. L.J. 1401, 1408–09 (2017). Laws are generally categorized as using
rules or standards to achieve a goal, but one scholar advances the idea of using technology
to create a new category of laws: microdirectives. Id. at 1402–03. Using predictive
technology, the author argues, will greatly diminish the need for human discretion because
it will allow lawmakers to gather information and use predictive algorithms to update the
law instantly based on all relevant factors. See id. at 1428. For example, some algorithms
have already been developed to ascertain the likelihood of a criminal defendant skipping
out on bail, leading to output data more reliable and less biased than any individual judge.
Id. (citing Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail, N.Y. TIMES
(June 26, 2015), http://www.nytines.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-granting-of-bailinto-a-science.html [https://perma.cc/B267-HDQR]). This imparts a factor of impartiality
and reduces the need for individual discretion in dealing with matters of the law. See id.
169. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995)
(noting that the University of Virginia “does not exclude religion as a subject matter” and
explaining that the prohibition of religious speech was viewpoint discrimination because
it was not excluded on the basis of subject matter).
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messages from religious viewpoints.170 To illustrate, the exclusion in Good
News Club broadly prohibited use of the forum “for religious purposes”
and was still found viewpoint discriminatory.171 As such, the relevant inquiry
is whether the law allows use of property for subjects discussed through a
non-religious lens while prohibiting discussion of those same subjects through
a religious lens.172 It is thus irrelevant that the guideline here prohibited
religion broadly.
Second, the D.C. Circuit attempted to distinguish the regulation here
from the regulations in Rosenberger, Lamb’s Chapel, and Good News
Club on the basis of the contrast between the breadth of subjects
encompassed by the fora in those cases and WMTA’s “express boundaries
and narrow character.”173 WMTA initially accepted ads on all types of
subjects, but then “closed its advertising space to issue-oriented ads, including
political, religious, and advocacy ads.”174 The D.C. Circuit failed to explain
how exactly a forum which is open to all ads except political, religious,
and advocacy ads was characterized by its “express boundaries and narrow
character.”175
Third, apparently noting this inconsistency, the D.C. Circuit then went
on to argue that the underlying messages the Archdiocese sought to address
were not “primarily or recognizably” about secular subjects. 176 The
Archdiocese stated that the topics it wished to address were “charitable
giving, Christmas, and opening hours on which [WMTA] allows non-religious
but not religious messages.”177 The D.C. Circuit disagreed, stating that the
“ad [was] not primarily or recognizably about charitable giving, as it [was]
not primarily or recognizably about opening hours or places to visit.”178
Instead, the D.C. Circuit advanced that the ad was a “religious ad, an
exhortation . . . to be part of [the] evangelical effort to attend mass.”179 “The
imagery of the . . . ad [was] evocative . . . of the saving grace of Christ,” which
was not an includible subject of the forum.180
170. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111 (2001) (“We disagree
that something that is ‘quintessentially religious’ or ‘decidedly religious in nature’ cannot
also be characterized properly as the teaching of morals and character development from
a particular viewpoint.”).
171. Id. at 103, 109.
172. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393
(1993).
173. Archdiocese of Wash., 897 F.3d at 327–28.
174. Id. at 318.
175. See id. at 327.
176. Id. at 329.
177. Id. at 328.
178. Id. at 329.
179. Id.
180. Id.
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However, the Supreme Court has never attempted to parse speech as
“primarily or recognizably” about anything. For example, in Lamb’s Chapel,
the film series discussed views “on the undermining influences of the media
that could only be counterbalanced by returning to traditional, Christian family
values instilled at an early stage.”181 The Supreme Court characterized the
film as “no doubt” one about the permissible subject of child rearing and family
values,182 notwithstanding the Christian overtones surrounding the entire
film, without attempting to distinguish what the “primary” focus of the
film was.183
Similarly, in Rosenberger, the Christian magazine included “articles
about racism, crisis pregnancy, stress, prayer . . . religious music[,] . . .
homosexuality, Christian missionary work, and eating disorders, as well
as music reviews and interviews with University professors.”184 The
Supreme Court found that religion provided a perspective from which a
variety of subjects were discussed, notwithstanding the magazine’s
“obvious religious content,”185 without attempting to dissect the primary
motivation of the magazine.186
Finally, in Good News Club, the Club aimed to use facilities for “singing
songs, hearing a Bible lesson and memorizing scripture.”187 The Court
found that “it [was] clear that the Club [taught] morals and character
development to children,” an otherwise permissible purpose, notwithstanding
the clear religious overtones,188 without disseminating what the primary
181. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 388 (1993).
182. Id. at 394.
183. See id. at 393–96.
184. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 826 (1995).
The magazine from the case, Wide Awake, calls itself “A Christian Perspective Literary
Magazine” on its website with a focus “dedicated to centralizing and vocalizing Christian
perspectives on grounds, uniting Christians at the University through artistic and literary
expression” and “aim[s] . . . to provide members of the [University] with the opportunity
to share their Christian perspectives with others.” About Wide Awake, WIDE AWAKE, https://
sites.google.com/site/wideawakeuva/ [https://perma.cc/M9W8-W7TK]. Surely such a strong
reference to religion implies Christianity as the primary motivation for creating the magazine.
185. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 110–11 (2001) (discussing
Rosenberger).
186. See id. at 110 (explaining that the holding in Rosenberger relied on denial of
funding instead of religion as a subject matter for the purposes of viewpoint discrimination).
187. Id. at 103 (citation omitted).
188. Id. at 108. “What matters for purposes of the Free Speech Clause is that we can
see no logical difference in kind between the invocation of Christianity by the Club and the
invocation of teamwork, loyalty, or patriotism by other associations to provide a foundation
for their lessons.” Id. at 111.
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purpose was. By stating that the Club “teaches” this secular purpose,
implying that it teaches non-secular purposes as well, the Supreme Court
implicitly rejected the notion that the secular purpose must be the dominant,
overarching, or prominent purpose, a perception that the D.C. Circuit
attempts to advance. Furthermore, the Court in Good News Club certainly
recognized the overarching, and potentially even dominant, religious content
of the Club, stating that “[g]iven the obvious religious content of Wide
Awake, we cannot say that the Club’s activities are any more ‘religious’ or
deserve any less First Amendment protection than did the publication of
Wide Awake in Rosenberger.”189 However, the Court still found the fact
that the Club taught a secular purpose dispositive to the determination that
the law was viewpoint discriminatory.
The intensive fact-based approach the D.C. Circuit attempted to
advance is extremely subjective and lends itself to endless litigation and
conflicting opinions. One person can look at a picture of a shepherd and
see a non-secular message, and another person can see a secular message.190
This exemplifies the problem with the D.C. Circuit’s approach. The
approach places too much discretion in the hands of government officials
who enforce the law and the judges who adjudicate it. It will force agencies
with no lawmaking or enforcement power to determine whether a given
advertisement is religious or not. Such extensive discretion is ripe for
abuse.
2. The Third Circuit Finds Impermissible Viewpoint Discrimination—
This Analysis More Closely Adheres to Supreme Court Precedent
In Northeastern Pennsylvania Freethought Society v. County of Lackawanna
Transit System, decided in 2019, an association of atheists, agnostics,
secularists, and skeptics (Freethought) brought an action against the County
of Lackawanna transit system (COLTS).191 COLTS leased advertising space
on the inside and outside of its buses and barred ads that:

189. Id. at 110.
190. The profession has also been invoked biblically to portray God as a shepherd.
See, e.g., The Shepherd in Christianity, JESUSBOAT, https://www.jesusboat.com/theshepherd-in-christianity/ [https://perma.cc/U7W4-UAVV]. Religious websites compare
God to a shepherd in the sense that the shepherd guides the flock, the shepherd must know
the way to guide the flock, the shepherd must protect the sheep, and the shepherd must be
willing to sacrifice. Id.
191. Ne. Pa. Freethought Soc’y v. Cnty of Lackawanna Transit Sys., 938 F.3d 424,
428 (3d Cir. 2019).
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promote the existence or non-existence of a supreme deity, deities, being or
beings; that address, promote, criticize or attack a religion or religions, religious
beliefs or lack of religious beliefs; that directly quote or cite scriptures, religious
text or texts involving religious beliefs or lack of religious beliefs; or that are
otherwise religious in nature.192

Freethought wanted to run an ad that simply read “Atheists” on a blue sky
with clouds that included their web address.193
The district court held that the policy was viewpoint neutral because it
“put the entire subject of religion out of bounds.”194 However, the Third
Circuit found that Rosenberger, Lamb’s Chapel, and Good News Club
were indistinguishable from the case here.195 The Third Circuit reasoned
that “if government permits the discussion of a topic from a secular perspective,
it may not shut out speech that discusses the same topic from a religious
perspective.”196 Here, COLT’s policy and practice showed that “the forum
[was] open to messages on all topics not expressly banned,” which implied
that all other topics were acceptable.197 The court determined that even
though the ad related to the subject of religion at large, Freethought’s
underlying “message [was] one of organizational existence, identity, and
outreach.”198 It was meant to communicate that “a local organization for
atheists exists” and that they are “not alone.”199 Because nothing in COLT’s
policy would prohibit secular organizations from advertising, the fact that
only religious organizations were banned from advertising constituted
viewpoint discrimination.200
This analysis adheres to Supreme Court precedent. Because the bus policy
would not “prohibit secular [organizations] from advertising their

192. Id. at 430.
193. Id. at 429. In London, Humanists UK launched the “Atheist Bus Campaign,”
which was primarily intended for buses in London, but grew in popularity and expanded
across the UK. Atheist Bus Campaign, HUMANISTS UK, https://humanism.org.uk/campaigns/
successful-campaigns/atheist-bus-campaign/ [https://perma.cc/GW3S-P4XX]. Launched
in 2009, the campaign was a direct response to many Christian adverts running on London
buses and drew massive public support. Id. Humanists U K believe that this support
exemplifies the notion that non-religious people want their voice to be heard. Id.
194. Ne. Pa. Freethought Soc’y, 938 F.3d at 430.
195. See id. at 432.
196. Id. at 434 (quoting Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J., Inc. v. Stafford Twp.
Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 528 (3d Cir. 2004)).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 435.
199. Id. at 434 (citation omitted).
200. See id. at 434, 442.
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organizational philosophy or from communicating the message: ‘We
exist, this is who we are, consider learning about or joining us,’” but
atheist and religious organizations are banned from doing so, the Third
Circuit correctly concluded that the restriction on speech was viewpoint
discriminatory.201 Even though the speech may have been “quintessentially
religious” or “decidedly religious in nature,”202 what matters to the analysis
is not how religious a message is, but whether it communicates a religious
or atheist viewpoint on a subject to which the forum is otherwise open.203
Thus, because the regulation prohibited Freethought’s statement of
organizational identity, due solely to the statement’s atheistic character, it
constituted viewpoint discrimination.204
One author, analyzing the same circuit split this Author identified
herein, advanced the opposite conclusion to this Comment.205 That author
argued that the Third Circuit’s proposed subject—one of informing others
about the existence of the organization and inviting others to join—was
“abstract” and would apply to too many advertisements looking to build
a company or brand. However, the scholar fails to mention how exactly
this purpose was “abstract” and why permitting too much speech is harmful
in any way. To the contrary, that argument is in conflict with the Court’s
repeated emphasis on promoting the free marketplace of ideas and limiting
government censorship.206
C. Why Religion Should Always be Classified as a Viewpoint
Religion should always be classified as a viewpoint, a lens through
which to see life, rather than an individual and separate subject matter.
First, Justice Brennan’s dissent in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights
expanded the concept of viewpoint to embrace such broad perspectives as
religion because of the critical point, embraced by some members of the
201. See id.
202. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 111 (2001).
203. See id. at 112 & n.4.
204. Ne. Pa. Freethought Soc’y, 938 F.3d at 435.
205. See Blythe McGregor, Forbidding Religious Advertisements on Buses: Subject
Matter or Viewpoint Regulation?, U. CIN. L. REV. (Nov. 13, 2019), https://uclawreview.org/
2019/11/13/forbidding-religious-advertisements-on-buses-subject-matter-or-viewpointregulation/ [https://perma.cc/493E-896X]. The author argues that because the Supreme
Court construed subjects narrowly in the past, the term should be construed narrowly in
the context of advertisements. Id. Because most advertisements are created with the
purpose of promoting a group, company, or brand, no ads could possibly be prohibited
under this framework. Id. However, this statement is too general, and in any case,
the author fails to explain how allowing such a wide variety of advertisements can possibly
be detrimental in light of the Court’s repeated emphasis on expanding the marketplace of
ideas. See supra text accompanying notes 61–68.
206. See supra Section II.B.
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Court, that discrimination does not become any less repugnant when it is
among entire classes of ideas rather than only particular views within a
class of ideas.207 This forecloses the argument that restrictions on religious
speech are constitutional simply because they treat all religions alike—
silencing multiple voices is equally as bad, if not worse, as silencing only
one.
Furthermore, the conclusion that religion is better characterized as a
viewpoint can be traced back to the Supreme Court’s statement in 1943
that “[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official . . . can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion . . . .”208 By characterizing religion
as a matter of opinion, the Court suggested that religion is more similar to
a viewpoint than a distinct subject matter. Opinions by their very nature
invoke positions, ideologies, and perspectives, which invoke viewpoints.
Opinions do not merely involve substance or content of a message.
Merriam-Webster defines “opinion” as “a view, judgement, or appraisal
formed in the mind about a particular matter.”209 This definition makes
clear that opinions are akin to viewpoints, which are formed about subject
matters—not that opinions are subject matters themselves. And because
the Supreme Court directly placed religion in the same category of opinions,
the conclusion advanced herein is significantly strengthened because it
stems from the very nature of religion:
Religion is not only a subject. It’s a worldview through which believers see
countless issues. It was so for our Nation’s founders, whose moral thesis changed
the world and conceived a new birth of freedom in the United States: “that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”210

Comparing religion to other topics advances the conclusion that religion
is more aptly classified as a viewpoint. In Texas v. Johnson, the Court
207. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 316–17 (1974) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (noting that discrimination does not become “any less odious” when it is
“among entire classes of ideas, rather than among points of view within a particular class”); see
also Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 102, 121–
22 (1996). The author believes that the Supreme Court established the rule that discrimination
against religious expression is always viewpoint-based. Id. at 102.
208. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (emphasis added).
209. Opinion, M ERRIAM -WEBSTER , https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
opinion [https://perma.cc/TD9P-AGDD].
210. Ne. Pa. Freethought Soc’y v. Cnty. of Lackawanna Transit Sys., 938 F.3d 424,
437 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776)).
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noted that “surely one’s attitude toward the flag and its referents is a
viewpoint.”211 The Court could have found instead that patriotism was a
subject matter, but instead classified it as a viewpoint. By the same token,
religion should be classified as a viewpoint.
Scholars suggest that “[t]he connection between religion and patriotism
is one that has long been noted.”212 Some similarities between religion
and patriotism include the use of symbols and rituals, fierce loyalty, and
emotional attachment. The blurring line between religion and patriotism
can be seen in country music,213 on American money,214 and even in the
Pledge of Allegiance.215 In fact, a study found that 68% of white evangelicals
report the most intense patriotic feelings, with the percentages of patriotism
going down to 56% of white mainline Protestants, 49% of minority
Christians, 48% of Catholics, and only 39% of religiously unaffiliated
Americans.216 This study exemplifies the intuitive idea that religion and
patriotism are significantly entwined, and lends credibility to the notion
that religion should be thought of as a viewpoint by all courts, much like
patriotism was thought of as a viewpoint by the Supreme Court.

211.
212.

Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 413 n.9 (1989).
Gene Weinstein, Aspects of Religion and Patriotism: Some Recent Studies, 23
ANTIOCH REV. 515, 515 (1963–1964). The author, invoking Machiavelli, “commented
that a prince must always appear religious” because citizens find it easier to fight and
subsequently die for their nation if that also means that they are “simultaneously dying for
God.” Id.
213. See Kelsey Dallas, Jesus, Take the Radio Dial: Country Music’s Evolving
Relationship with Religion, D ESERET N EWS (Jan. 25, 2016, 6:50 AM), https://www.
deseret.com/2016/1/25/20580894/jesus-take-the-radio-dial-country-music-s-evolvingrelationship-with-religion [https://perma.cc/547T-8MU5] (discussing country music and
“their reflections on patriotism, faith, family and life in rural America”).
214. See Arthur Schlesinger Jr., When Patriotism Wasn’t Religious, N.Y. TIMES
(July 7, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/07/opinion/when-patriotism-wasn-treligious.html [https://perma.cc/HU5A-N7RC ] (discussing the phrase “In God We Trust”
on coins). One scholar describes recent arguments—made by states requiring public
schools to post “In God We Trust” in classrooms—that the phrase isn’t really religious.
Rob Boston, If ‘In God We Trust’ Isn’t Really a Religious Statement, Then What Exactly
Is It?, AMERICANS UNITED: WALL OF SEPARATION BLOG (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.au.
org/blogs/wall-of-separation/if-in-god-we-trust-isnt-really-a-religious-statement-thenwhat-exactly-is [https://perma.cc/6VSR-MBKQ]. The arguments have actually worked,
with courts asserting that such “generic forms of religiosity” have lost their “religious
meaning by constant repetition.” Id. However, the author finds this proposition absurd,
arguing that the phrase is obviously religious and urges children to trust in one God. Id.
215. See The Pledge of Allegiance, U.S. HIST., https://www.ushistory.org/documents/
pledge.htm [https://perma.cc/TUY8-WVXX] (“[O]ne Nation, under God . . . .”).
216. White Evangelicals the Most Patriotic, Poll Finds, USA TODAY (June 28, 2013,
5:44 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/28/rns-evangelical-patriotic/
2473971/ [https://perma.cc/QNP6-HQ6D].
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In addition, the conclusion advanced herein finds direct support in
Justice Kennedy’s 2017 four-Justice concurrence in Matal v. Tam.217 It is
curious logically that banning more speech is more constitutional than
banning less. This is the heart of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Matal
v. Tam. He stated that “prohibit[ing] all sides from criticizing their opponents
makes a law more viewpoint based, not less so.” 218 Thus, a general
prohibition on all religious speech, whether that speech may be Buddhist,
Christian, Catholic, Jewish, Hindu, Agnostic, Atheist, or of another affiliation,
makes the law more viewpoint based, not less so. Furthermore, Justice
Kennedy stated that the viewpoint neutrality principle “protects the right
to create and present arguments for particular positions in particular ways,
as the speaker chooses.”219
Applying this analysis to the cases here, the Archdiocese’s proposed
advertisement in Archdiocese of Washington v. Washington Metro Area
Transit Authority was aimed to encourage charitable gift giving during the
holiday season and promote Christmas and holiday opening hours.220 The
viewpoint neutrality principle should thus protect the right of the Archdiocese
to advance this chosen position though an advertisement invoking religious
aesthetic. Freethought’s proposed advertisement in Northeastern Pennsylvania
Freethought Society v. County of Lackawanna Transit System was aimed
to inform the public about and encourage membership in Freethought’s
organization.221 Similarly, the viewpoint neutrality principle should thus
protect the right of Freethought to spread a message of organizational
awareness and involvement as chosen—through an advertisement with the
word “Atheists” in it.
Categorizing religion as a viewpoint, as advanced herein, is justifiable
through the lens of public policy as well. Back in 1919, the Supreme Court
stated that free speech has the purpose of promoting the “free trade in
ideas.”222 In order to meet this policy goal and promote such free trade of
217. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765–69 (2017) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment).
218. Id. at 1766.
219. Id.
220. See supra Section III.B.1.
221. See supra Section III.B.2.
222. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
This is a popular justification for protecting free speech, which theorizes that the “free
dissemination of ideas” allows “the truth [to] compete[] and eventually win[] out
over falsehood.” Brian Miller, There’s No Need to Compel Speech. The Marketplace of
Ideas Is Working, F ORBES (Dec. 4, 2017, 3:44 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/briank
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ideas, restrictions on speech should be seldom allowed. By this token,
allowing for more rather than less speech to be broadcast “put[s] the
decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of
us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more
capable citizenry.” 223 In other words, allowing more types of speech
presumably increases the quality of our society.224 Classifying religion as
a viewpoint will lead to less restrictions on speech and enhance the pool
of communication available to our society.
Furthermore, placing restrictions on religious speech may “distort the
marketplace of ideas,” a fear that the Supreme Court emphasized repeatedly.225
Restricting religious speech may distort the marketplace of ideas in the
sense that by restricting such speech, there will be fewer religious ideas
expressed than there would be without the restrictions—this is a distortion
in the pool of ideas.
Another related point for why religion is better characterized as a
viewpoint is related to this interruption of the free trade of ideas and
squelching of the marketplace of ideas. There are certain situations where
religious speech is more clearly a viewpoint than a subject matter. For
example, the subject of abortion is clearly secular on its face, but can be
discussed through a religious lens. On the other hand, there are some
circumstances where it is harder to find the secular meaning behind seemingly
purely religious speech. For example, discussion about whether there is
or is not a God seems to invoke the entire subject matter of religion.
Critics of this Comment will surely invoke such speech to argue that
religion can sometimes be a subject matter as well. However, that “sometimes”
is a reason for pause. To ban religious speech would cover both of the
miller/2017/12/04/theres-no-need-to-compel-speech-the-marketplace-of-ideas-is-working/?sh=
3130fd344e68 [https://perma.cc/9TTH-UP65]. The author advances that this justification
may explain recent attempts to limit speech. Id. The author then poses the question, once
the truth is discovered, why should dissenting views be tolerated? Id. For example, this
argument comes to light when people complain about controversial public speakers. Id.
The author cautions that the law also protects the dissenters and controversialists, and this
justification should not be used to quell free speech. Id.
223. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971).
224. The ACLU articulates three reasons why freedom of expression is essential to
a free society: (1) “It’s the foundation of self-fulfillment”; (2) “It’s vital to the attainment
and advancement of knowledge, and the search for the truth”; and (3) “It’s necessary to
our system of self-government and gives the American people a ‘checking function’ against
government excess and corruption.” Freedom of Expression, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/
other/freedom-expression [https://perma.cc/2MUS-KE9D].
225. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 182 (2015); see also Consol. Edison
Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537–38 (1980) (“If the marketplace of
ideas is to remain free and open, governments must not be allowed to choose ‘which issues
are worth discussing or debating . . . .” (quoting Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S.
92, 96 (1972))).
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scenarios laid out above. Even if religious speech may sometimes constitute a
subject, a restriction on both types of scenarios would undeniably result
in some forms of viewpoint discrimination, which is enough to invalidate
the law. Furthermore, even the most purely religious speech can have secular
roots as well. Using the example above, discussion of the existence of
God invokes secular ideas such as thoughts about the meaning of life, fate,
destiny, and the idea of secular morality.226
In addition, accepting religion as a viewpoint rather than a distinct subject
matter will reduce extensive fact-based inquiries, legislation, uncertainty
within the law, and disagreements between courts, as exemplified by the
circuit split discussed herein. The analysis used for ascertaining whether
or not a restriction bans religious viewpoint on an otherwise allowable
subject is extensively fact based. It involves analyzing not only the permissible
subjects allowed, but also the character of the religious speech, to understand
whether there is an underlying secular subject. As discussed above, it is
not hard to justify even the most seemingly religious speech on secular
grounds such as membership in a group, promotion of an organization, or
invocation of charity or generosity. Because it is hard to think of religious
speech with absolutely no secular characterization, the analysis is not very
relevant, taking up precious judicial time and resources. As such, religion
should always be categorized as a viewpoint.
IV. CONCLUSION
The fear of viewpoint discrimination can be thought of as two-fold.
First, the more obvious fear arises from the censoring of only one particular
side of a subject matter. This constitutes obvious viewpoint discrimination
because it allows the government to “prescribe what shall be orthodox”
by suppressing one side and allowing another side to speak.227 Limits on
only one side of a particular debate or subject are obviously unconstitutional in
that by suppressing one side, the government advocates for another side
without allowing the public to gain a broader understanding of all sides of
particular subjects.

226. Religious morality rests on fear of reprisal from various deities, but secular
morality is founded on a more reasoned and naturalistic worldview. See PHILIP A. PECORINO,
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION ch. 9, § 7 (2001) (ebook). “There are therefore examples of
societies and cultures that have moral codes without a belief in a deity and there are efforts
to establish a moral order that is not founded on religion.” Id.
227. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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The second form of viewpoint discrimination creates the legal issue
analyzed in this Comment and is much more subtle and nuanced. This
form ignores the fact that all particular “sides” of a seemingly innocuous
subject matter are banned together 228 and instead focuses on whether
perspectives on otherwise includable subjects are restricted. Using this
definition, the prohibition of religious advertisements on buses constitutes
impermissible viewpoint discrimination because the advertisements will,
in these two cases here and almost always, discuss permissible subjects
through the impermissible lens of religion. Such a result stems from the
very nature of religion—a viewpoint through which countless issues are
often discussed.

228.
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See Greenawalt, supra note 96, at 703–04.

